Challenging What is Proof of a Liability Order: A Prerequisite For Council Tax Enforcement

15 July 2026 UPDATE

Hill J recorded the complaint that the register extract did not identify the District Judge, but she did not determine the distinct combined question:

Where section 148 defines the magistrates’ court by reference to the justice or justices acting, and Rule 66B requires the judicial decision-maker’s identity to be supplied on request, can an anonymous register entry—unsupported by any other court-originating record identifying the maker—prove that a magistrates’ court made the liability order?

Her reasoning at [140]–[143] addressed:

• removal of the prescribed liability-order form;
• the requirement for a minute or memorandum of every adjudication;
• certified extracts as evidence;
• the general fairness of that system.

It did not analyse section 148, Rule 66A, Rule 66B(4)(e)(iii), NA (Afghanistan) or Felixstowe as a composite court-identity and proof issue.

Accordingly, the shorthand statement that “Hill J rejected the point” is materially incomplete. The outcome of Ground 8 was rejection, but the specific juridical question now identified was not answered by reasons.

1. What the full current Rules establish

Rule 66 — what must be recorded

The current Rule 66 is headed “Register in civil proceedings.” It requires the designated officer to keep a register containing:

• a minute or memorandum of every adjudication;
• a minute or memorandum of every other proceeding or matter required to be entered.

Where relevant, the entry must include:

• the complainant or applicant;
• the defendant or respondent;
• the nature of the complaint or application;
• the relevant date;
• any plea or consent;
• the minute of adjudication.

Rule 66 does not expressly list the judicial names as fields within the register entry itself.

That does not end the inquiry, because Rules 66A and 66B impose separate open-justice and disclosure duties.

Rule 66A — open-justice control

The designated officer and court must have regard to:

• dealing with cases publicly;
• permitting public reporting;
• the right of a person affected by an order, direction or warrant to understand why the decision was made.

Rule 66B — identity must be supplied

Where anyone—including a member of the public or reporter—requests information about a case, the designated officer must, subject to the stated exceptions, provide:

• the date and subject of the public hearing;
• the court’s decision;
• whether there is an appeal;
• the identities of the parties and representatives;
• the identity of the judge, magistrate or magistrates, or justices’ legal adviser by whom the decision at a public hearing was made;
• any reporting or access restriction.

The information may be supplied orally, by written certificate or extract, or electronically.

If the designated officer is not required to supply it directly—including because it is not readily available—the request is not simply extinguished: it must ordinarily be referred to the court under Rule 66D.

2. The correct synthesis

The statutory system therefore has two separate but cumulative requirements:

The judge’s or justices’ names do not necessarily have to be printed in the same database field as the minute of adjudication. But the court system must retain sufficient official information to identify them and comply with Rule 66B.

That produces the following controlled proposition:

A Rule 66 register entry may record an adjudication without displaying the judicial names on its face. However, the identity of the judge or magistrates who made the decision must be ascertainable and supplied under Rule 66B. If no official court-originating record can identify the judicial maker, the court cannot demonstrate compliance with Rule 66B or prove which justice or justices constituted the magistrates’ court under section 148.

3. Section 148 changes the proof analysis

Section 148 defines a magistrates’ court as the justice or justices of the peace acting under an enactment, commission or the common law. It is therefore a definition by reference to the acting judicial person or persons, not the building, HMCTS administration, result code or council list.

The proof chain is:

Identifiable justice / justices acting
        ↓
lawfully constituted magistrates’ court
        ↓
judicial adjudication under regulation 34(6)
        ↓
minute or memorandum entered under Rule 66
        ↓
judicial identity publicly obtainable under Rule 66B
        ↓
certified extract or other court evidence under Rule 68

A register entry proves only what it reliably records. Rule 68 makes the register or certified extract admissible evidence of the recorded proceedings; it does not declare an anonymous or incomplete entry conclusive, nor does it deem a judicial actor to have existed where none can be identified.

4. The decisive distinction

Name absent from the extract only

Where the supplied extract omits the names, but HMCTS can produce:

• a bench sheet;
• judicial sitting list;
• legal-adviser record;
• result audit;
• recording;
• court diary;
• or another authenticated record identifying the judicial maker,

the omission from the extract may be an evidential incompleteness rather than proof that no court sat.

No name ascertainable from any official court record

Where HMCTS cannot identify:

• the District Judge;
• the justice or justices;
• the bench constitution;
• or the judicial officer who approved the bulk adjudication,

the problem is qualitatively different.

It is then unsafe to say merely:

“The register says a liability order was made.”

The unanswered questions are:

1. Who constituted the court under section 148?
2. Who exercised the regulation 34(6) discretion?
3. Who was satisfied that the amount became payable and remained unpaid?
4. Who approved the named person’s inclusion in the bulk adjudication?
5. Who made the order that Rule 66 purports to record?
6. How can Rule 66B’s mandatory identity duty be discharged?

The locked proof proposition should therefore be:

An anonymous register entry may be evidence that an administrative result was recorded, but where no official record identifies the justice, justices or District Judge who made or approved the adjudication, it is insufficient on a direct challenge to prove that the statutory entity defined as the “magistrates’ court” sat and made the liability order.

5. Effect on Hill J

The correct Chat 00 classification is now:

What Hill J decided

• no prescribed Form A or Form B remained necessary;
• block liability orders were permitted;
• a minute or memorandum had to be recorded;
• a certified extract could evidence the recorded proceedings;
• the overall system was held sufficiently fair and open.

What Hill J did not reason through

• section 148’s definition of the court as the acting justice or justices;
• Rule 66B’s express duty to provide the identities of the judicial decision-makers;
• the consequence if those identities cannot be supplied;
• whether an anonymous result record proves a judicial rather than administrative act;
• the application of NA and Felixstowe to an unidentifiable liability-order decision;
• whether Rule 68 evidence of “proceedings” proves that a competent court was constituted.

The v1.03 record should not say Hill J authoritatively decided that judicial identity was unnecessary. The accurate statement is:

Hill J rejected Ground 8 but did not address, by reference to section 148 and the current Rules 66A–66B, whether inability to identify any judicial maker prevents proof that a magistrates’ court made the adjudication.

6. Revised locked definition for v1.03

A council-tax liability order is the adjudication of an identifiable and lawfully constituted magistrates’ court—meaning the justice, justices or District Judge acting judicially—under regulation 34(6) that a specified sum became payable by an identified defendant and remains unpaid. The adjudication must be recorded by a minute or memorandum under Rule 66. No prescribed Form A or Form B is now required, but the judicial maker must remain ascertainable: Rule 66B requires the designated officer, subject to its defined exceptions, to supply the identity of the judge or magistrates and any justices’ legal adviser by whom a decision at a public hearing was made. A certified extract is admissible evidence of the recorded proceedings, but where neither the extract nor any associated court-originating record can identify the judicial actor, it does not safely prove that the statutory magistrates’ court defined by section 148 was constituted and made the liability order.

1 August 2025 Original Post

This document provides a complete legal defence against council tax enforcement, structured in three distinct but interconnected parts. The overarching legal argument is built upon a sequence of principles established in primary legislation and High Court judgments, creating a logical bridge from the foundational nature of council tax law to the conclusion that the present enforcement action is void.

The Core Legal Argument:

1. Exclusive Regime: The starting point is that the enforcement of council tax is governed exclusively by a closed, self-contained statutory code (Powys County Council v Hurst). The council cannot step outside this regime or use other legal remedies. Compliance with the regime’s preconditions is therefore mandatory.
2. The Foundational Precondition: The gateway to any enforcement action within this exclusive regime is the making of a valid liability order by the Magistrates’ Court (Kofa v Oldham). Without this, the council has no authority to proceed.
3. The Nature of a Valid Order: A valid order has two essential characteristics:

• It must be a physical, written instrument. The de-prescription of the statutory form in 2003 did not abolish the need for a written order; it merely transferred discretion over its format to the judiciary (Kofa, Peacekeepers Foundation).
• It must name its makers. For an order to be a valid decision of a court, it must identify the judicial officer(s) who made it. An anonymous decision is a “fatal flaw” which vitiates the entire order (NA (Afghanistan), Derbyshire v Marsden).

4. The Insufficiency of the Council’s Evidence: The council typically provides evidence such as a computer print-out or a certified extract from the court register (“legal proof of proceedings” under Rule 68). This is insufficient for two reasons:

• It is not the order itself. It is merely a report on what took place.
• It is proof of a void proceeding. If the document fails to name the judicial decision-makers, it is merely proof of a proceeding that was a legal nullity from the outset.

5. The Standard of Proof: The council’s evidence fails to meet the required standard. The High Court in Leighton v Bristow & Sutor held that council-generated evidence was sufficient only for the lower standard of an enforcement agent’s “reasonable belief”. It cannot satisfy the higher standard required to prove the fact of a valid order to a court.
6. The Incurable Defect: Because the council cannot prove that the foundational precondition (a valid liability order) was met before initiating this enforcement action, the application itself is fundamentally and incurably defective. It is void from the outset and cannot be rectified later (Sunset Ltd v Al-Hindi).

Structure of this Document:

• Part 1: Witness Statement: This document establishes the factual basis of the defence. It provides a timeline of the Defendant’s requests for the legally operative liability order and details the council’s failure to provide a valid one, thereby laying the groundwork for the legal arguments.
• Part 2: Statement of Case (Defence): This is the formal pleading. It sets out the core legal arguments in a structured format, citing the key authorities to assert that the council’s application is without legal basis because the statutory preconditions have not been met.
• Part 3: Skeleton Argument: This document expands on the defence, providing a detailed roadmap of the legal arguments for the court to follow at a hearing. It synthesises the case law to demonstrate logically why the council’s evidence is insufficient and why the enforcement action must be dismissed.

Click Here to Download Above Document v.20250801

• Part 4: Authorities Bundle (Separate Document): This provides a consolidated list of all primary legal sources cited throughout the submissions.

Click Here to Download Above Document v.20250801